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COMPLEX LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND COMPLEX
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES: NAVIGATING THE
APPLICABLE LAW ACROSS THE CONTINUUM OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Laurie R. Blank*
Modern conflicts and stability operations pose complex challenges for both
military and civilian actors tasked with promoting the rule of law during
conflicts and stability operations. Military operations can occur both during
armed conflict and in situations that do not qualify as armed conflict, such as
disaster relief or humanitarian intervention.1 The now oft-used term “stability
operations” encompasses U.S. military activities conducted “outside the United
States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or
reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”2
The legal classification of a particular situation, including non-conflict
situations, determines which law governs the actions, rights, and obligations of
those involved. The continuum of conflict ranges from domestic disorders to
non-international armed conflicts to international armed conflicts, including
belligerent occupation. Other situations involving the use of military force or
military capabilities may include counter-piracy or counterterrorism
operations, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance. In addition, conflicts
sometimes involve elements of both international and non-international armed
conflict and often evolve from one form of conflict into another. The
emergence of new forms of conflict, for which there may be no ready
characterization, complicates matters. For example, acts of transnational
terrorism could constitute an international armed conflict, a non-international
armed conflict, a law enforcement operation, or, perhaps, a new category of
conflict. Indeed, stability operations occur across the spectrum of military
operations, within the context of international armed conflict, non-international

*

Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School of Law.
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 401–409 (2006); S. REP. NO. 109-322, at 467–550 (2006).
2 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-07: STABILITY OPERATIONS, at vi (2008), http://downloads.
army.mil/docs/FM_3-07.pdf [hereinafter STABILITY OPERATIONS] (quoting JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT
PUBLICATION 3-0: DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS, at xxi (2001), http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_
and_evolution/source_materials/dod_joint_ops_doctrine.pdf).
1
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armed conflict, and non-conflict situations. Such operations thus involve
multiple legal frameworks, including international humanitarian law, human
rights law, and the domestic law of both the territorial state and the state
sending troops, as well as, perhaps, a United Nations (“UN”) mandate and
bilateral or multilateral treaties, or additional layers such as joint operations
doctrine.
Understanding how these various legal regimes interact in practice on the
ground is a challenging task and is fundamental to promoting the rule of law in
conflict and post-conflict environments.3 For example, uncertainty about the
applicable law can impact a range of determinations including, among others,
detention regimes, targeting, and the parameters of the authority and
responsibility for conducting operations. Identifying the applicable law in a
conflict or during a stability operation is thus an essential first step that enables
both military and civilian actors to define their engagement in any international
intervention.
This challenge is often compounded when states involved in a conflict or
military operation do not explicitly characterize it, or when coalition partners
have conflicting views as to its characterization. For example, the United
States chose not to characterize its operation in Panama as an armed conflict.4
Instead, the United States described its operation—one that involved the
deployment of approximately 30,000 U.S. troops and extensive hostilities
between U.S. and Panamanian forces—as assistance to the legitimate

3 This Article grew out of the discussions at the pilot meeting of Mind the Gap: Assessing the
Applicable Law Across the Continuum of Conflict, a project initiated by the International Humanitarian Law
Clinic at Emory University School of Law, with the support of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The project has
been renamed Rules of War and Tools of War; the Author is the Project Director; Project Co-Chairs are
Professor Michael N. Schmitt, Chair, International Law Department, Naval War College; and Professor Amos
N. Guiora, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. The project brought together leading practitioners
and scholars with operational and legal experience in a range of conflicts and peace and stability operations for
a two-day meeting in September 2010. In particular, the expert group focused on: (1) identifying the key legal
questions that arise over the continuum of conflict scenarios; (2) assessing whether and how problems in
defining the conflict situation and identifying applicable legal regimes complicate effective and legal
interventions; (3) determining which relevant materials and products would be most useful for military and
civilian actors on the ground; (4) addressing how to better train key actors in this regard; and (5) developing a
framework for better analyzing the key questions and dilemmas identified. The Author is grateful to the
participants at the initial pilot meeting for their insights on these issues and, in particular, would like to thank
Benjamin R. Farley, J.D., Emory University School of Law (2011), for his excellent research assistance and
contributions to the discussion and the preparation of this Article.
4 United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 794–95 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Geoffrey S. Corn & Sharon G.
Finegan, America’s Longest Held Prisoner of War: Lessons Learned from the Capture, Prosecution, and
Extradition of General Manuel Noriega, 71 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1117 (2011).
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government of Panama (although it applied the law of armed conflict as a
matter of policy).5 Alternatively, while the United States has declared that it is
in an armed conflict in Afghanistan with both the Taliban and al Qaeda,
coalition partners such as Germany remained reluctant, until recently, to
characterize their involvement under the aegis of the International Security
Assistance Force (“ISAF”) as an armed conflict.6 Thus, even within the same
coalition, some nations would not apply the same legal framework to their
activities, creating differing interpretations of rights and obligations.
Although international law provides a framework—albeit more or less clear
depending on the situation—for the characterization of conflict and nonconflict situations, other factors will often come into play from the perspective
of a particular state. For example, characterization of conflict impacts cohesion
among coalition partners, the nature of contemporary operations, and the
linkage between tactics and broader policy issues and choices. A range of
background issues will also be relevant, such as the connection between law
and policy, the process by which law is made, and the role of law in the
policymaking process. For some observers, the lack of or uncertain
characterization of a conflict up front may be seen as the direct cause of
numerous legal and policy challenges; for others, it is an inherent aspect of the
law and decision-making process, and is symptomatic of the tensions between
strategic-level policymaking and tactical-level operational decision-making.
Nonetheless, although the choice not to characterize a military operation does
afford policymakers a great deal of flexibility—a valid and advantageous goal
that allows them to tailor operations to particular needs—characterization of
conflicts matters from a legal perspective—it makes a difference normatively
and not just on a policy level.
This Article analyzes the impact of differing legal characterizations, or a
lack of characterization altogether, in complex conflict situations. Amid the
complicated set of considerations that contribute to conflict characterization,
the interaction of different applicable legal frameworks poses several key
issues that policymakers and military and civilian decision-makers should
5

Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 795; Corn & Finegan, supra note 4, at 1117–18.
See Timo Noetzel, Germany’s Small War in Afghanistan: Military Learning amid Politico-Strategic
Inertia, 31 CONTEMP. SECURITY POL’Y 486, 487 (2010) (“Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, speaking
explicitly as a representative of the government as a whole, announced before the Bundestag that Germany
now considered the conflict in all of Afghanistan, and thus including the northern part of the country, an
‘armed conflict in terms of international humanitarian law.’”) (quoting Guido Westerwelle, Foreign Minister,
Address at the Bundestag (Feb. 10, 2010), available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/
Presse/Reden/2010/100210-BM-BT-Afghanistan.html).
6
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consider and weigh seriously. Part I provides a brief background of the legal
framework for conflict characterization and highlights some additional policy
and strategic considerations as a framework for the primary analysis of the
overlapping legal frameworks. Part II presents four main categories of
operational concepts that can be particularly vulnerable to uncertain conflict
characterizations and highlights the legal fault lines that may result from such
ambiguity or uncertainty. The first category, detainee issues, includes
detention, treatment, transfer, and trial. The second category, use of force,
encompasses targeting, weapons, and host nation influence on operations. In
the third category, civil–military relations, the primary issues include
humanitarian assistance and relations between the military and
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”); and the fourth category focuses on
third state responsibilities during conflict and related situations. In all of these
areas, operational challenges can arise in the face of uncertain or differing
characterizations of conflict, underscoring the importance of the normative
legal frameworks and the need to understand how they interact, and the
consequences of any legal fault lines.
I. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE LEGAL, POLICY, AND STRATEGIC SCENE
A. Conflict Characterization in Brief
Distinguishing between situations of armed conflict and situations not
categorized as armed conflict is essential to understanding the rights,
privileges, and obligations of states, non-state entities, NGOs, and individuals
in both situations. At the most basic level, the rights and duties associated with
war—such as the right to attack and kill enemy operatives or the right to detain
such persons without charge or trial until the end of hostilities—may only be
invoked during periods of armed conflict.7 As noted above, however, states
will often engage in military operations (broadly defined) outside of armed
conflict, whether in situations that do not rise to the level of armed conflict or
in situations such as disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. In the absence
of armed conflict, international human rights law and domestic law govern the
conduct of states and individuals and set out their relevant rights, privileges,

7 See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings, at 10, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston); Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in
Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat, 39 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 30 (2011).
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and duties. It is important to note that international human rights law and
domestic law continue to apply even during armed conflict; there is a
continuing debate about the extent and content of that application in different
types of situations.8 The contours of that debate lie beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is important, especially for the purposes of the instant analysis,
to recognize the existence of multiple legal frameworks in a variety of conflict
and non-conflict situations.
The law of armed conflict (“LOAC”)—otherwise known as the law of war
or international humanitarian law—governs the conduct of both states and
individuals during armed conflict, and it seeks to minimize suffering in war by
protecting persons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the means
and methods of warfare.9 The 1949 Geneva Conventions endeavor to
encompass all instances of armed conflict10 and set forth two primary
categories of armed conflict that trigger the application of LOAC: international
armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. Common Article 2 of the
Geneva Conventions states that the conventions “shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them.”11 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions sets forth
8

Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 7, at 9–12, 10 n.53.
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions,
at 4, Pub. Ref. No. 0703 (2002), available at http://www.ehl.icrc.org/images/stories/resources/ihl_answers_to_
your_questions.pdf. The law of armed conflict is codified primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter GC IV]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter GC I].
10 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 26 (Oscar M. Uhler & Henri Coursier eds., 1958)
[hereinafter GC IV COMMENTARY] (“Born on the battlefield, the Red Cross called into being the First Geneva
Convention to protect wounded or sick military personnel. Extending its solicitude little by little over other
categories of war victims, in logical application of its fundamental principle, it pointed the way, first to the
revision of the original Convention, and then to the extension of legal protection in turn to prisoners of war and
civilians. The same logical process could not fail to lead to the idea of applying the principle in all cases of
armed conflict, including internal ones.”).
11 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 2; GC III, supra note 9, art. 2; GC II, supra note 9, art. 2; GC I, supra note 9,
art. 2 [collectively hereinafter Common Article 2].
9
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minimum provisions applicable “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties.”12 The term “armed conflict” was adopted specifically to avoid the
technical legal and political pitfalls of the term “war” and prevent states from
claiming that the law does not apply because no declaration of war has been
issued.13 As such, determination of the existence of an armed conflict does not
turn on a formal declaration of war or even on how the participants
characterize the hostilities, but rather is based on the facts of a given
situation.14
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) set forth the contemporary definition of armed conflict
in Prosecutor v. Tadic.15 The ICTY held that an armed conflict exists
whenever “there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State.”16 The first portion of the definition refers
to international armed conflict; the second to non-international armed conflict.
A thorough analysis of the definition of armed conflict and the objective
triggers for the existence of either an international armed conflict or a noninternational armed conflict is beyond the scope of this Article. The purpose in
this brief background section is to set forth the basic framework of when
LOAC is triggered and the distinction between international and noninternational armed conflict. LOAC applies during all situations of armed
conflict, with the full panoply of the Geneva Conventions and customary law
applicable in international armed conflict and a more limited body of
conventional and customary law applicable during non-international armed
conflict.17
International armed conflict occurs when there is any conflict between two
states. Neither the duration of the hostilities, the intensity of any fighting, nor

12 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 3; GC III, supra note 9, art. 3; GC II, supra note 9, art. 3; GC I, supra note 9,
art. 3 [collectively hereinafter Common Article 3].
13 See generally GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 17–25 (addressing Common Article 2).
14 Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International
Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 85 (2005) (“[I]t is worth emphasizing that recognition of the
existence of armed conflict is not a matter of state discretion.”); Sylvain Vite, Typology of Armed Conflicts in
International Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 69, 72 (2009).
15 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
16 Id. ¶ 70.
17 Id. ¶¶ 67, 70.
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the number of wounded or killed affects the characterization as an armed
conflict. Rather, as the Commentary to the Geneva Conventions explains,
“[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of
armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one
of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.”18
Non-international armed conflicts present a more complex identification
paradigm than international armed conflicts. In general, non-international
armed conflicts involve protracted armed violence between a government and
organized armed groups or between two or more such groups.19 Treaty
provisions do not specify any particular test for determining the applicability of
Common Article 3. Instead, as the Commentary explains, the goal is to
interpret Common Article 3 as broadly as possibly.20 In identifying noninternational armed conflict, the law seeks to “distinguish[] armed conflict
from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities,
which are not subject to international humanitarian law.”21 For example, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights characterized a short-lived
attack on a military barracks as a non-international armed conflict because of
“the concerted nature of the hostile acts undertaken by the attackers, the direct
involvement of governmental armed forces, and the nature and level of the
violence.”22 Some factors or characteristics that are useful in identifying a
Common Article 3 conflict include the response of the state,23 such as whether
it employs its regular armed forces and whether it has recognized the non-state
actor as a belligerent, and the capability of the non-state actor, such as whether
it has an organized military force under a responsible command and whether it
18 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 20. Note that because all states are parties to the Geneva
Conventions, the requirement in Common Article 2 that an international armed conflict be a dispute between
two High Contracting Parties is akin to a dispute between two states.
19 Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 70.
20 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 36 (“Does this mean that Article 3 is not applicable in cases
where armed strife breaks out in a country, but does not fulfill any of [the suggested criteria]? We do not
subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, that the scope of application of the article must be as wide as
possible.”).
21 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
July 15, 1999). Government forces are presumed to be sufficiently organized to be a party to an armed conflict.
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgement, ¶ 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Apr. 3, 2008).
22 Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95
doc. 6 rev. ¶ 155 (1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm#_ftn1
(“[P]articularly, the attackers involved carefully planned, coordinated and executed an armed attack, i.e., a
military operation, against a quintessential military objective—a military base.”).
23 Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS
OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 17 (Michael W. Lewis ed., 2009).
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acts as a de facto governing entity within a determinate territory.24 In
particular, courts and tribunals have focused on two primary considerations:
“the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to the
conflict.”25 Intensity looks at the seriousness of the fighting to determine
whether it has passed from riots and other somewhat random acts of violence
to something more akin to regularized military action. Courts look to a nonstate party’s level of organization as one way to distinguish armed conflict
from unorganized violence and riots, and consider factors such as hierarchical
structure, territorial control and administration, the ability to recruit and train
combatants, the ability to launch operations making use of military tactics, and
the ability to enter peace or cease-fire agreements.26
B. Policy Considerations
Characterization of conflict has broader policy and strategic-level
consequences as well, beyond the legal paradigms. Although flexibility at the
policymaking level is understandably desirable from a policy standpoint, it
may result in uncertainty and ambiguity for military and civilian actors
executing the missions. When the legal framework—which sets forth each
party’s rights and obligations—is unclear, the operational challenges multiply
exponentially. Beyond the immediate challenges on the ground, these
ambiguities create two additional problems. First, ad hoc answers to
operational challenges may not be readily transferable to the next operation,
leaving operators in the unfortunate position of having to readdress challenges
and redevelop solutions already faced by their predecessors elsewhere. Second,
military and civilian actors will often be left in an uncertain position with
respect to their local counterparts, particularly regarding the appropriate
parameters for providing advice or counsel, or performing a mentoring role.
Two other important issues arise beyond these significant tactical and
operational level concerns. One common response to the question of uncertain
24 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 35–36. None of these factors is dispositive; rather, these and
other factors may be used to distinguish acts of banditry, short-lived insurrection, or terrorist acts from armed
conflict. Cases apply different and overlapping factors to determine whether an armed conflict existed. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 879–88 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 20, 2009); Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 49; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T,
Judgement, ¶ 84 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
¶¶ 562–67; Vite, supra note 18, at 76–78.
25 Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 562.
26 Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 60; see also Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, ¶ 884; Limaj, Case No.
IT-03-66-T, ¶¶ 95–109.
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characterization is that it is U.S. policy to apply the full panoply of LOAC in
all military operations—to apply the law applicable in international armed
conflict to all situations. Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E thus states
that “[m]embers of the [Department of Defense] Components comply with the
law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized, and in all other military operations.”27 This policy minimizes
confusion on the ground, creates a standard set of rules, provides for training
without the ambiguities of multiple legal frameworks, and generally facilitates
certainty of action for troops and commanders. This approach clearly has great
value. However, when considering whether the lack of or conflicting
characterizations has an impact on military operations, the across-the-board
policy approach also can have two primary and problematic consequences in
complex stability operations and conflict—consequences that policymakers
should understand, explore, and consider.
The first is an issue of limitation, the second of obligation. As stated above,
it is U.S. policy that all situations be viewed as triggering the obligations of the
law applicable to international armed conflict and U.S. troops are trained
accordingly. While this approach does create certainty, it also means that in
complex conflict and stability operations, military leaders and junior and senior
commanders may forfeit opportunities to craft more specific solutions and
options appropriate to the situation on the ground. In essence, when U.S.
policy is to follow the law of international armed conflict unless told
otherwise, identifying the “unless told otherwise” times is a critical task to
tease out the different types of options available to military and civilian leaders
and operators on the ground. The flip side of this first concern is that by
treating all situations—from a normative legal perspective—as international
armed conflict, commanders and soldiers may find themselves in situations in
which, by following the law of international armed conflict, they could actually
be in violation of human rights and other legal obligations applicable in the
internal conflict or other emergency situation at hand.
II. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES AND LEGAL FAULT LINES
In many contemporary conflicts, the complicated nature of the situation on
the ground leads to overlapping legal frameworks, uncertain or conflicting
characterizations, and other factors that pose challenges for the analysis of
27 DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2311.01E: DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM ¶ 4.1 (2011), available at http://
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf.
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legal operational obligations and parameters. This Article focuses on four areas
in which legal obligations and issues can prove particularly vulnerable to
uncertain conflict characterization and thus highlight the legal fault lines at
issue: detainee issues, use of force, civil–military relations, and third state
responsibilities. In each of these areas, uncertainty regarding the applicable
legal framework can create ambiguities because the legal obligations and
parameters differ depending on the characterization of the conflict or situation.
When these ambiguities produce uneven, delayed, or ineffective
implementation of legal obligations, protections for individuals can be
affected. Other concerns involve the legitimacy of particular operations and the
effective accomplishment of a designated mission. Beyond the tactical and
operational ambiguities, each of these areas also raises concerns about the
forfeiting of opportunities to craft responses specific to the situation on the
ground and the potential for violations of other legal obligations. This Part
outlines the key legal frameworks in each of these areas to highlight the
operational challenges that can arise, in essence, to frame the normative issues
and differences that make characterization matter on the policy and strategic
levels, and not just in the lawyer’s office.
A. Detainee Issues
International humanitarian law provides the legal framework for detention
in both international and non-international armed conflicts.28 Human rights law
continues to apply across the spectrum of conflict as well, in varying ways. In
non-conflict scenarios, the domestic law of the host state regulates detention,
with human rights law providing minimum standards of conduct.29 In any or all
of the situations, UN mandates, bilateral agreements, and other legal
frameworks can play an important role as well. This Subpart encompasses four
particular areas: detention authority, treatment of detainees, trial, and transfer.
The legal understanding of the military operation—characterization as either
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, or not a
conflict—impacts the parameters and term of the detention, the relevant
international humanitarian law and human rights norms applicable upon
transfer, procedures for review and prosecution, and other issues.
28

GC III, supra note 9, arts. 4–5; GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 42, 78. In non-international armed conflict,
the authority to detain stems directly from the principle of military necessity and is a fundamental incident of
waging war. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552–53 (2004); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 10, at 9.
29 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 99
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (defining minimum human rights standards for detention).
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1. Detention Authority
Detention authority and obligations can differ depending on the
characterization of any given scenario in five key areas: the basis for detention;
procedural requirements for detention; the conditions of detainee release;
outside monitoring of detention; and detainee contact with the outside world.
Although fundamental notions of respect for human dignity underlie the
parameters for detention in any legal regime, international or domestic, the
precise content of the legal rights and obligations do differ between
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, and non-conflict
situations. As a result, uncertainty about the governing legal paradigm can lead
to ambiguity or confusion regarding the appropriate approach.
a. Basis for Detention
In an international armed conflict or occupation, LOAC provides for the
detention of combatants and of civilians who either participate in hostilities or
pose a threat to the security of the occupying power.30 Prisoners of war
(“POWs”) may be detained for the duration of hostilities and must be
repatriated at the close of hostilities.31 Under the POW detention regime in the
Third Geneva Convention and earlier customary and conventional law,
preventing a return to hostilities is the underlying purpose of detention.32 In
particular, POWs are not liable to prosecution for their lawful wartime acts,
which reinforces the fact that they are not held as a form of punishment for
engaging in combat.33 Historical and modern incarnations of law of war
detention rest on this notion. As the Lieber Code stated, in one of the earliest
codifications of the modern law of war, “So soon as a man is armed by a
sovereign government, and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity, he is a
belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts, are not individual
30

GC IV, supra note 9, art. 5.
GC III, supra note 9, art. 118.
32 In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) (“The object of capture is to prevent the captured
individual from serving the enemy. He is disarmed and from then on he must be removed as completely as
practicable from the front, treated humanely and in time exchanged, repatriated or otherwise released.”).
33 United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“Lawful combatant immunity, a
doctrine rooted in the customary international law of war, forbids prosecution of soldiers for their lawful
belligerent acts committed during the course of armed conflicts against legitimate military targets. Belligerent
acts committed in armed conflict by enemy members of the armed forces may be punished as crimes under a
belligerent’s municipal law only to the extent that they violate international humanitarian law or are unrelated
to the armed conflict. This doctrine has a long history, which is reflected in part in various early international
conventions, statutes and documents.”); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 30–31 (2004); see also GC III, supra note 9, arts. 87, 99.
31
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crimes or offences.”34 The Nuremberg Tribunal similarly upheld this purpose
for POW detention.35
Persons who do not qualify for POW status can nonetheless be detained
during international armed conflict as well. The Fourth Geneva Convention
explicitly contemplates the detention of civilians during international armed
conflict “only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely
necessary,”36 or during belligerent occupation for “imperative reasons of
security.”37 The Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention offers some
further explanation about the nature of imperative reasons of security:
[A] belligerent may intern people . . . if it has serious and legitimate
reason to think that they are members of organizations whose object
is to cause disturbances, or that they may seriously prejudice its
security by other means, such as sabotage or espionage. . . . [T]he
State must have good reason to think that the person concerned, by
his activities, knowledge or qualifications, represents a real threat to
38
its present or future security.

In particular, the mere fact that an individual is an enemy national is not
sufficient to justify such internment; rather, any detention must be based on an
individualized determination of the threat to security the individual poses.39
For example, “[s]ubversive activity carried on inside the territory of a Party to

34 FRANCIS LIEBER, WAR DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD ¶ 57 (1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
35 Judgment, 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
171 (1947), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 229 (1947); see also TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND
VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 19 (1970) (“War consists largely of acts that would be criminal if
performed in time of peace. . . . Such conduct is not regarded as criminal if it takes place in the course of war,
because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity over the warriors.”); Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-ofWar Status, 84 INT’L. REV. RED CROSS 571, 572 (2002).
36 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 42.
37 Id. art. 78; see also id. art. 5 (referring to individuals who are “definitely suspected of or engaged in
activities hostile to the security of the State”); Ashley S. Deeks, Security Detention: The International Legal
Framework: Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 403, 404 (2009)
(describing “situations in which states engaged in armed conflict may detain persons” without criminal
charges).
38 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 257–58.
39 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 9.31 (2004)
[hereinafter U.K. MANUAL]; Deeks, supra note 37, at 407 (“Embedded in these rules is the unstated
requirement that a person must be detained based on the particularities of his situation. For instance, a state
may not detain a person for something his neighbor has done, or use a person as a bargaining chip to obtain the
release of a detainee held by the opposing state.”); Ryan Goodman, The Second Annual Solf–Warren Lecture
in International and Operational Law, 201 MIL. L. REV. 237, 245 (2009).
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the conflict or actions which are of direct assistance to an enemy Power” fit
within this framework.40
Civilian internees during international armed conflict or occupation are
detainable for only as long as the reasons underlying the initial detention
persist,41 at which time they are to be returned to their place of residence at the
time of their detention, or, if they were in transit when detained, to their point
of departure.42 For example, the UN Security Council Resolution governing
the activities of the Multi-National Force-Iraq authorized the coalition forces to
“take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and
stability in Iraq,”43 including “internment where . . . necessary for imperative
reasons of security.”44 The primary recourse a detaining power has in such
circumstances is to assigned residence or internment, and only if security
reasons make such measures absolutely necessary.45 The rules governing such
internment bear a marked similarity to many of the rules for POW detention,
including the obligation to ensure that internment camps are not exposed to the
dangers of war.46
In situations of non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3 clearly
contemplates detention of one or more forms, referencing individuals who are
hors de combat because of detention, among other reasons.47 However, no
specific provision in LOAC delineates authority for detention in internal armed
conflict, where POW status does not exist. Military necessity thus forms the
foundation for detention pursuant to LOAC in such conflicts.48 In essence, it is
40

GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 258; Goodman, supra note 39, at 245–46.
GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 132–33 (“Internees in the territory of Party to the conflict against whom
penal proceedings are pending . . . may be detained until the close of such proceedings.”).
42 Id. art. 135.
43 S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004); see also Public Notice, Office of the
Adm’r of the Coal. Provisional Auth., Regarding Public Incitement to Violence and Disorder (June 5, 2003),
available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/cpa/english/regulations/PN1.pdf (announcing that all individuals
engaged in public incitement to violence and disorder “will be subject to immediate detention by CPA security
forces and held as security internee[s] under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949”).
44 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 43, Annex I, at 11. For a comprehensive discussion of security detention in
Iraq, see Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the Other
War, 2003-2010, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 549 (2011).
45 GV IV, supra note 9, art. 78.
46 GC III, supra note 9, art. 43. For further discussion of the specific rules governing internment of
civilians and the similarities to POW detention, see U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶¶ 9.37–.86.
47 Common Article 3, supra note 12 (“Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause”).
48 See R (Al Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Defence, [2008] 1 A.C. 332, 368 (2006) (U.K.) (holding that the
power to detain is implicit in customary LOAC); CHATHAM HOUSE & INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
41
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generally recognized that anyone who may be lawfully targeted in internal
armed conflict may likewise be detained49: notably, members of organized
armed groups and civilians directly participating in hostilities. Domestic law
will often serve as the basis for detention in non-international armed conflict,
for crimes such as murder and treason. Furthermore, the fact that international
law provides safeguards for persons detained in such conflicts suggests that it
contemplates that operations in internal armed conflict do include the authority
to detain.
Beyond authority found in LOAC and domestic law, detention during
armed conflict can also rest on authorization in relevant UN Security Council
resolutions. In particular, UN Security Council resolutions authorized
detention as part of multinational operations in Kosovo and Iraq.50 For
example, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 stated that the international
security force’s responsibilities in Kosovo would include “[e]nsuring public
safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for
this task.”51 This mission to ensure public safety was understood to provide a
basis for the multinational force to undertake detention. As a NATO press
release at the time explained, one “necessary means” for maintaining security
and law and order “may be the detention of individuals who pose a threat to the
safe and secure environment in Kosovo. Such detentions are fully compliant
with international law, are used sparingly and will last for only as long as is
absolutely necessary.”52 Similarly, UN Security Council Resolution 1546
expressly authorized the multinational force in Iraq to “take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”53
In Iraq, detention authority was specifically linked to that provided in the

PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR SECURITY DETENTION IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 5–6 (2008)
[hereinafter CHATHAM HOUSE]; Geoffrey S. Corn, The Problem with Law Avoidance, NAT’L SECURITY L. REP.
(Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Law & Nat’l Sec., Chi., Ill.), Winter 2010, at 4, 6.
49 See infra Part II.B.
50 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (providing a mission to ensure
public safety and order that was interpreted to provide a basis for detention in Kosovo); S.C. Res. 1546, supra
note 43, Annex I, at 11 (stating that, in order to counter ongoing security threats, the multinational force will
intern individuals where necessary for imperative reasons of security).
51 S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 50, ¶ 9(d).
52 Press Release, Kosovo Force, DFOR Detention Under UNSCR 1244 (May 5, 2004), available at
http://www.nato.int/kfor/docu/pr/2004/05/28.htm; see also Behrami v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), ¶ 124,
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow “Case- Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC”
hyperlink; then search by placing “Behrami” in the “Case Title” box and “France” in the “Respondent State”
box).
53 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 43, ¶ 10.
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Fourth Geneva Convention: “necessary for imperative reasons of security.”54
In Afghanistan, ISAF detention authority is considered to stem from UN
Security Council Resolution 1833, which directs ISAF “to take all necessary
measures to fulfill its mandate,”55 but does not specifically authorize detention.
In non-conflict situations, much like in non-international armed conflict,
domestic law and international human rights law provide the framework for
detention. Among other requirements, human rights norms require that
detention be grounded in previously established law, that the detainee be
informed of the reasons for his detention, and that all detention be subject to
judicial review.56
b. Procedural Requirements
LOAC mandates basic procedural requirements for the detention of
individuals within the context of an international armed conflict or occupation.
In the case of persons potentially entitled to POW status, Article 5 of the Third
Geneva Convention states that if “any doubt arise[s] as to whether persons,
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, [merit POW status], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the
present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal.”57 For those persons where POW status is clear, such as
soldiers captured in uniform, no such status hearing is required, because there
is no doubt regarding status.58 For others, this obligation helps ensure that
persons are granted the appropriate treatment and classification under the law.
It also helps fulfill one spirit and purpose behind the Geneva Conventions
framework that all detainees must have some status, either as a POW or as a
civilian internee:
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered
by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth
Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel of the

54

See id., Annex I, at 11.
S.C. Res. 1833, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1833 (Sept. 22, 2008).
56 See ICCPR, supra note 29, arts. 9(1)–(4). This is also true in situations of occupation for the detention
of civilians who violate ordinary penal law. See GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 67, 71–73.
57 GC III, supra note 9, art. 5.
58 See id. arts. 4–5.
55
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armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no
59
intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.

LOAC contains no specific procedural requirements for Article 5 tribunals
other than the general statement that such hearings must be held by a
“competent tribunal.”60 It is generally understood that Article 5 hearings “were
not envisaged as judicial bodies obliged to comply with fair trial guarantees”
but can be significantly less formal and organized.61 Detaining powers mandate
the particular procedural framework, which can and will differ depending on
the location, nature of the conflict, number of detainees, and other factors.62
One example of such procedures can be found in the guidance provided by
U.S. Central Command to Army units during the 1991 Gulf War, which
defined a tribunal as a “panel of three commissioned officers, at least one of
whom must be a judge advocate, convened to make determinations of fact
pursuant to GPW Article 5.”63 In the United Kingdom, Article 5 tribunals are
governed by the 1958 Prisoner of War Determination of Status Regulations,64
according to which a competent tribunal “consists of a board of inquiry which
makes a report that constitutes the effective determination of the status of the
person concerned.”65
In the case of civilians detained during international armed conflict or
occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention sets forth procedural requirements
and protections. Article 43 mandates that “[a]ny protected person who has
been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such
action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or
administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.”66
Any such court or administrative board must review the case at least twice

59

GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 51.
GC III, supra note 9, art. 5.
61 Jelena Pejic, Unlawful/Enemy Combatants, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT:
EXPLORING THE FAULT LINES 335, 336 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
62 Id.
63 U.S. CENT. COMMAND, REGULATION NUMBER 27-13, CAPTURED PERSONS: DETERMINATION OF
ELIGIBILITY FOR ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR STATUS ¶ 5(k) (1995), available at http://www.aclu.org/
torturefoia/legaldocuments/july_docs/(G)%20%20MISCELLANEOUS%20BATCH%201.pdf. The regulation
set forth the powers of the tribunal, including calling witnesses, determining the mental and physical capacity
of the detainee to participate, and requiring or requesting the production of documents, and the rights of the
detainee during the proceeding. Id. app. C, ¶ 4.
64 See U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 8.21.
65 Naqvi, supra note 35, at 588 (noting that the regulations include the requirement that detainees be
represented by a lawyer at the public expense).
66 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 43.
60
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each year to determine if the individual detained can be released.67
Furthermore, protected persons detained for imperative reasons of security
under Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention are entitled to appeal and
periodic review of their detention.68 The goal of these provisions is to
minimize opportunities for abuse by ensuring procedures for appeal and
regular review. As the Fourth Geneva Convention’s Commentary explains,
[t]he essential point is that protected persons should be absolutely
free to make their appeals and that the authorities should examine
them with absolute objectivity and impartiality. They must never
forget that the Convention describes internment and placing in
assigned residence as exceptionally severe measures which may be
applied only if they are absolutely necessary for the security of the
69
State.

Unlike POWs, therefore, who are held until the end of hostilities without
review of their detention (except in cases of penal prosecution for crimes
committed pre-capture or during captivity), civilians detained in the course of
international armed conflict or occupation have the right to appeal and periodic
review of their detention.70 Given the extraordinary power enemy or occupying
forces have over such civilians, such obligations and procedures are critically
important.71
Neither conventional nor customary law relating to armed conflicts
includes any statement regarding the procedural requirements for detention in
67

Id.
See id. art. 78 (“Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to
a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present
Convention.”).
69 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 260–61.
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 60 (1999) (stating that the rules authorizing security detention of civilians
during international armed conflict as an extraordinary measure “require that it be implemented pursuant to a
regular procedure which enables the detainee to be heard and to appeal the decision ‘with the least possible
delay’”). In Iraq, for example, the procedures for detention by the multinational force included specific
procedures for review:
68

Detainees in Iraq receive review of their detention every six months. These periodic reviews
occur in the form of a Multi-National Force Review Committee (MNFRC), a three-officer board
that assesses the threat posed by each detainee. The MNFRC reads the case summary to the
detainee at the review. The detainee may make an oral statement to the Committee, may present
evidence, and may ask questions of witnesses. The Committee informs the detainee of the final
decision within 45 days of the review.
Deeks, supra note 37, at 422.
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non-international armed conflict, particularly administrative detention akin to
that contemplated in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I.
As the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”)
recently noted in reporting on the current state of LOAC, “[t]here are simply
no procedural safeguards in treaties of humanitarian law to deal with [the
widespread practice of internment without criminal charge] during noninternational armed conflicts.”72 Notably, Additional Protocol II, which applies
only to a certain class of non-international armed conflicts and includes
enhanced protections relative to Common Article 3, makes no mention of
procedures to be taken at the start of or during detention.73 Rather, such
detention and any requisite procedures are governed by domestic law,74 which
may incorporate or be informed by human rights provisions and the due
process requirements set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), for example.75 Customary international law
forbids arbitrary detention in non-international armed conflict.76 These same
standards—in domestic law and international human rights law—form the
appropriate paradigm in non-conflict situations as well.

72 Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Strengthening Legal Protection for
Victims of Armed Conflicts (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
statement/ihl-development-statement-210910.htm.
73 Additional Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts between a state signatory to the
Protocol and “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations and . . . implement” the Protocol. AP II, supra note 9, art. 1. Article 5 of Additional Protocol II
provides protections for persons who have been detained, but is silent as to procedures, appeals, or reviews.
See, e.g., Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Between International
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law—Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulations of Internment in
Non-international Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 437, 442 (2009) (“The Second Additional
Protocol applicable in non-international armed conflict briefly mentions internment, but provides no guidance
regarding procedures either to assess the decision to intern or to terminate captivity. Again, Common Article 3
does not speak to the issue.”).
74 Deeks, supra note 37, at 405. It is unclear, however, whether a state engaged in a non-international
armed conflict in the territory of another state, as is the case for the United States in Afghanistan, may draw
upon its own domestic law or only the domestic law of the state in which it is operating. See CHATHAM
HOUSE, supra note 48, at 7.
75 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 29, arts. 8–10. Note also that the law of international armed conflict can
provide useful analogies and guidance for exploring the parameters of detention in non-international armed
conflict. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 39, at 240–42.
76 In the context of a non-international armed conflict, arbitrary means detention of a civilian not
supported by military necessity or detention of a civilian beyond the existence of the necessity requiring the
initial detention. See CHATHAM HOUSE, supra note 48, at 4.
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c. Outside Monitoring
The law of international armed conflict establishes a framework for
external monitoring and implementation of the obligations of states. The
concept of a “protecting power,” which first appeared in a treaty in the 1929
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, relies on neutral
third states to protect the rights and duties of parties to international armed
conflicts.77 Articles 8 and 9 of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions set
forth the protecting powers system.78 The ICRC also plays an essential role in
monitoring the implementation of LOAC during armed conflict, particularly
with regard to POWs and other detainees. In particular, given that the
protecting power system has barely, if ever, been used in the years since World
War II, “[t]he role of the ICRC has taken on an increasing importance in the
light of the failure of states to appoint protecting powers.”79
With regard to detention in international armed conflict, Protecting Powers
and the ICRC “shall have permission to go to all places where prisoners of war
may be, particularly to places of internment, imprisonment and labour, and
shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war . . . . [and] be
able to interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners’
representatives.”80 Article 143 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides for
the same rights for Protecting Powers and the ICRC regarding protected
persons81 detained during the course of international armed conflict.82 In both

77 See generally George A.B. Peirce, Humanitarian Protection for the Victims of War: The System of
Protecting Powers and the Role of the ICRC, 90 MIL. L. REV. 89 (1980) (describing the history of the
protecting power system in both customary and treaty law).
78 Respectively, Article 8 of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 9 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention state:

The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the
Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For this
purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff,
delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said
delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are to carry out their
duties. The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the task of the
representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers.
GC IV, supra note 9, art. 9; GC III, supra note 9, art. 8.
79 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 16.13.1.
80 GC III, supra note 9, art. 126.
81 Protected Persons are a specially defined class of persons in international armed conflict, defined in
Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: “Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” GC IV, supra note 9, art. 4.
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situations, detaining powers cannot prohibit visits by Protecting Powers or the
ICRC except for “reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an
exceptional and temporary measure.”83
LOAC does not impose any obligations for outside monitoring of
individuals detained in non-international armed conflicts, but there remains at a
minimum the recognition that persons should not be held incommunicado.84
Furthermore, the ICRC has a right to request access to persons detained in such
conflicts and regularly visits detention centers in a range of countries involved
in non-international armed conflict.85 In the absence of armed conflict,
international law does not include any procedures for or obligations to submit
to outside monitoring of detention.
d. Conditions of Release
Consistent with the other facets of detention addressed here, LOAC
provides significant guidance regarding the conditions of release for POWs
and civilian internees during international armed conflict, but offers minimal
guidance regarding the release of detainees in non-international armed conflict.
A fundamental feature of the POW regime is that POWs must be repatriated as
soon as possible after the end of active hostilities.86 Once the fighting is over,
the justification for holding enemy personnel—removing them from the
battlefield—no longer exists. The Third Geneva Convention then sets forth
detailed procedures for such repatriation, including the restoration of any
articles of value to POWs and provisions for POWs to take their personal
effects with them upon repatriation or have them forwarded.87 For civilians
interned for imperative reasons of security during occupation or international
armed conflict, the regime for release includes an additional element. Like
POWs, civilian internees must be released as soon as possible after the close of
hostilities. In a clear demonstration of a key difference between POW
detention and civilian internment, however, the Fourth Geneva Convention
82 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 143 (“Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have
permission to go to all places where protected persons are, particularly to places of internment, detention and
work. They shall have access to all premises occupied by protected persons and shall be able to interview the
latter without witnesses, personally or through an interpreter. . . . The delegates of the International Committee
of the Red Cross shall also enjoy the above prerogatives.”).
83 Id.; GC III, supra note 9, art. 126.
84 Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375, 389–90 (2005).
85 Id. at 391.
86 GC III, supra note 9, art. 118.
87 Id. art. 119.
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also requires that each individual internee be released as soon as the reasons
necessitating his or her internment have ended, which may be during the
conflict.88 This rule thus reinforces “that internment may be ordered only if the
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”89 One final
provision governing the release of detained persons appears in Additional
Protocol I: Article 75(3) mandates that
[e]xcept in cases of arrest of detention for penal offences, [all persons
arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed
conflict] shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in
any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention
90
or internment have ceased to exist.

Recognizing the importance placed on prompt release and repatriation of both
POWs and civilian internees, the grave breaches provisions of Additional
Protocol I include an “[u]njustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of
war or civilians” as a grave breach.91
In non-international armed conflict, much like in the other areas covered
here regarding detention, the conventional law offers little, if any, guidance
regarding conditions of release and repatriation. Although Additional Protocol
II refers, albeit obliquely, to the release of detained persons in Articles 2(2)92
and 5(4),93 treaty law governing non-international armed conflict contains no
specific provisions detailing the timeframe or the obligations relevant to
release and repatriation. The ICRC’s Customary International Law Study
includes as customary law the rule that “[p]ersons deprived of their liberty in
relation to a non-international armed conflict must be released as soon as the
reasons for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist,” based on agreements

88
89
90
91
92

See GC IV, supra note 9, art. 132.
GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 510–11.
AP I, supra note 9, art. 75(3).
Id. art. 85(4)(b).
Additional Protocol II dictates:
At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose
liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their
liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the
protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty.

AP II, supra note 9, art. 2(2).
93 Id. art. 5(4) (“If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure
their safety shall be taken by those so deciding.”).
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in various internal conflicts, national legislation, and official statements.94 In
non-conflict situations, again, domestic law—as informed by human rights
obligations—governs the terms and process for release of detainees.
e. Contact with the Outside World
The Geneva Conventions establish a comprehensive framework for POWs
and civilian internees to communicate with the outside world during
international armed conflict. In both situations, elaborate rules set forth the
number and type of correspondence permitted, parameters for censorship,
obligations regarding postage, and other specifics.95 One significant difference,
however, is that civilians interned under an occupation may be restrained from
communicating with the outside world if they are believed to be saboteurs,
spies, or definitively engaged in hostile acts against the occupying power, and
military security necessitates such restrictions.96 In light of concerns about the
potential widespread application of this derogation article, the Commentary to
the Fourth Geneva Convention emphasizes “that Article 5 can only be applied
in individual cases of an exceptional nature, when the existence of specific
charges makes it almost certain that penal proceedings will follow . . . [and
never] as a result of mere suspicion.”97
Interestingly, in a departure from the previous categories, the conventional
law does include at least one statement regarding communication rights of
detainees during non-international armed conflict. Article 5 of Additional
Protocol II, which applies only to a certain subset of non-international armed
conflict,98 states that persons interned or detained for reasons relating to the
armed conflict “shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards, the
number of which may be limited by competent authority if it deems
necessary.”99 With limits for the capability of the detaining power and
concerns of necessity, this protection is significantly less comprehensive and
less mandatory than the protections set forth in the Third and Fourth Geneva
94 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 451–53 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL].
95 See, e.g., GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 107–12; GC III, supra note 9, arts. 71–77.
96 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 5. (“Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as
a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying
Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having
forfeited rights of communication under the present Convention.”).
97 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 58.
98 See AP II, supra note 9, art. 1(1).
99 Id. art. 5(2)(b).
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Conventions, but it does represent an important recognition that persons
detained during non-international armed conflict must not be held
incommunicado.
The ICCPR does not delineate specific rights to communication for persons
detained in non-conflict situations. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations mandates that all foreign nationals detained before or after
trial have a right to consular visits and communication.100 Furthermore, in two
comprehensive sets of principles regarding the rights of detained persons and
the obligations regarding their treatment, the UN has set forth several rules or
minimum standards with regard to communication. The UN Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners states that prisoners “shall be
allowed under necessary supervision to communicate with their family and
reputable friends at regular intervals, both by correspondence and by receiving
visits.”101 This document also reinforces the right to consular visits and
communication, as does the UN General Assembly’s Body of Principles for
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment.102
*******
Divergent characterizations of a conflict or blurred lines between situations
can lead to significant ambiguities and operational complexities regarding who
has authority to detain individuals and for how long. For example, varying
characterizations of the situation in Afghanistan have led not only to divergent
practices between U.S. forces engaged in the Operation Enduring Freedom and
ISAF missions, but to multiple different practices among the ISAF contributing
states.103 For example, while one state authorizes its forces to detain under the
ISAF aegis, another refuses to detain at all. Thus, when the latter state finds
itself in a position where it must detain an individual, it will not detain that
individual, but rather hold him or her in place until a detaining state can arrive
to detain the individual. Moreover, divergent practices among even the ISAF

100

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 27 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva,
Switz., Aug. 22–Sept. 3, 1955, Proceedings of the Congress, Annex I(A) art. 37, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/6/1, at
69 [hereinafter Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners].
102 G.A. Res. 43/173, annex princ. 16(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988).
103 See generally AFG. INDEP. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, TORTURE, TRANSFERS, AND DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS: THE TREATMENT OF CONFLICT-RELATED DETAINEES IN AFGHANISTAN (2012), available at
http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/AIHRC%20OSF%20Detentions%20Report%20English%2017-3-2012%
20%28Final%29%20.pdf.
101
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detaining states led NATO, after several years, to finally impose the uniform
ninety-six hour detention rule on all ISAF forces.104 In addition, as the past
decade has highlighted, uncertainty or debate regarding the overarching legal
paradigm for a conflict between a state and non-state terrorist groups—
including questions regarding the characterization, duration, and geographic
parameters of the conflict, among others—have left states and others “without
clear, comprehensive international rules to govern . . . detention operations.”105
2. Treatment
In all situations—whether international or non-international armed conflict,
or a non-conflict situation—international law protects all individuals, including
those who have been detained, from cruel or inhuman treatment and torture.
Beyond the provisions in the four Geneva Conventions that apply in all
situations of international armed conflict, international law contains numerous
prohibitions on the use of torture and other abusive treatment.106 In internal
armed conflict, “[t]he treatment of detainees is governed by the domestic law
of the country concerned, any human rights treaties binding on that state in the
time of armed conflict and . . . basic humanitarian principles.”107 The
prohibition against torture is jus cogens and no derogations are allowed,
whether in times of national crisis or armed conflict.108
POWs and protected persons in an international armed conflict or
occupation, however, are specially protected from not just cruel or inhuman
treatment, but also from insult or public display.109 Similarly, human rights law
prohibits subjecting civilian prisoners to insult or public curiosity.110 The
comprehensive international law prohibitions on torture and cruel or inhuman

104 See Press Conference, James Appathurai, NATO Spokesman, Remarks on the Foreign Ministers’
Meetings (Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051208g.htm (outlining IASF
detention policy).
105 John B. Bellinger & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four
Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (2011); see also
Deeks, supra note 37, at 434 (arguing for the acceptance of five basic rules governing detention in all
situations to avoid the challenges of conflict characterization, promote counterinsurgency goals, and, in
multinational detention operations, “ensur[e] that allies start from the same procedural propositions”).
106 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter UN Convention Against
Torture].
107 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 15.30.3.
108 UN Convention Against Torture, supra note 106, annex art. 2.
109 GC III, supra note 9, art. 13.
110 See, e.g., Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 101, art. 45(1).
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treatment, found in LOAC and in human rights law, lead to similar legal
paradigms for treatment of detainees across the spectrum of conflict
characterization. However, differing characterizations of conflict do impact
one area of treatment in particular: the privileges owed to POWs in
international armed conflict and civilians detained by an occupying authority.
For example, Article 25 of the Third Geneva Convention mandates that POWs
be “quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the
Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area,”111 with allowances made
for special national or religious practices, and separate sleeping quarters for
women and men.112 POWs and civilian internees “shall enjoy complete latitude
in the exercise of their religious duties”113 and have access to “intellectual,
educational and recreational pursuits, sports and games.”114 Such privileges do
not apply to adult individuals detained in a non-international armed conflict or
in a non-conflict situation. Treatment is thus one area in which fundamental
norms of international law prohibiting torture and inhuman treatment across all
situations create a consistent paradigm for the treatment of persons detained in
a range of situations. Nonetheless, the types of seeming technicalities
described above are relevant and can present stumbling blocks in the absence
of clear legal frameworks on the ground.
3. Trial
The trial of detainees—and the nature and amount of process afforded to
them—depends on the character of the conflict and status of the detainee. In
international armed conflicts, including occupation, international law strictly
regulates the trial of POWs.115 POWs can be tried only in a court-martial and
only for offenses for which soldiers of the detaining state would likewise be
tried.116 Most importantly, under the principle of combatant immunity
explained above, LOAC proscribes the trial of a lawful combatant for lawful
acts of war committed within the context of an armed conflict—thus, for
instance, a combatant may not be prosecuted for murder for the otherwise
lawful act of killing an enemy combatant.117 Combatants are, however, subject
to trial for war crimes, other pre-capture criminal acts unrelated to the conflict,
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

GC III, supra note 9, art. 25.
U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 8.49.
GC IV, supra note 9, art. 93.
Id. art. 94.
See, e.g., GC III, supra note 9, arts. 84–88.
Id. arts. 84, 87.
See id. art. 99; supra text accompanying note 34.
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and crimes committed during captivity.118 Individuals who engage in hostilities
but are not combatants can be tried in a variety of fora, including military
commissions, domestic courts, international tribunals, and other appropriate
venues. In all such cases, however, international law mandates a minimum
threshold of judicial guarantees and protections.119 During occupation,
detained civilians are subject to the laws and courts of the occupied state that
existed prior to the occupation.120
In internal armed conflict, on the other hand, LOAC offers little guidance
for trials of either persons who are fighting or other individuals. All persons
taking no active part in hostilities are protected from extrajudicial sentencing
and execution, as informed by general principles of international law.121
Customary international humanitarian law applicable in non-international
armed conflict is recognized as guaranteeing a right to fair trial for all
detainees.122 Importantly, though, individuals engaged in a non-international
armed conflict are not protected by combatant immunity, meaning they may be
tried under domestic law for murder for engaging in acts which, had they been
committed by a combatant during an international armed conflict, would be
considered lawful.123 Ultimately, persons detained during a non-international
armed conflict, though protected by Common Article 3, are subject to domestic
law.124
Obviously, persons detained in a non-conflict scenario are subject to the
established law of the host state in the tribunals of that state. Multinational or

118 Corn & Finegan, supra note 4, at 1121–23; Joseph P. Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful
Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV.
1, 9–10 (2004).
119 See AP I, supra note 9, art. 75.
120 Detained civilians are also subject to any newly enacted provisions of the occupying power subject to
the provisions of Fourth Geneva Convention, including its prohibition on retroactivity. See GC IV, supra note
9, art. 65.
121 Common Article 3, supra note 12.
122 CIHL, supra note 94, at 352–54. A fair trial is one: that is conducted before an independent, impartial,
and regularly constituted court; that presumes the innocence of the detainee; where the detainee has been
informed of the nature and cause of the charges against him; where the detainee is provided with the means
and opportunity to defend himself; and where the trial is public and occurs without undue delay.
123 John P. Cerone, Status of Detainees in Non-international Armed Conflict, and Their Protection in the
Course of Criminal Proceedings: The Case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y
of Int’l Law, Wash. D.C.), July 14, 2006, available at http://www.asil.org/insights060714.cfm (noting that
“non-state combatants in a non-international armed conflict may be prosecuted for all hostile acts, including
violations of ordinary domestic law, irrespective of whether they have violated any norms of international
law”).
124 Id.
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foreign forces deployed to a host state as part of a stability operations mission
may be subject to either the host state’s domestic law or the deploying state’s
domestic law, depending on a governing Status of Forces Agreement
(“SOFA”) or, potentially, an applicable UN mandate.
Complex military operations and uncertain characterization can create a
range of ambiguities and complications in this area. Without a firm legal
framework in place, military and civilian actors on the ground may face
significant uncertainties regarding who can be tried, in what venue, under what
procedures, and for what crimes. As a consequence, individuals detained may
face lengthier detention and a lack of access to individual accountability
determinations because of the need to assess the appropriate parameters for
trials.
4. Transfer
The principle of non-refoulement and the associated human rights
protections apply to the transfer of prisoners at all times. According to these
protections, individuals may not be transferred to states where they will likely
suffer severe human rights deprivations, particularly torture or inhuman
treatment.125 Most importantly, “[t]he prohibition on torture is regarded as
nonderogable, not subject to any exclusions, and also binding where the
rendering state is a party to the treaty but the receiving state is not.”126 Nonrefoulement is a foundational principle in refugee law, which has an important
role for the protection of persons caught up in armed conflict. Article 33 of the
1951 Refugee Convention prohibits the forcible return or expulsion of a
refugee “in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”127
Within the context of armed conflict, recent experiences in Afghanistan and
Iraq demonstrate the relevance of transfer and the applicable legal frameworks
in today’s conflicts and military operations. In particular, the main transferrelated issues that may differ based on the characterization of a given situation
include where and to whom a detainee may be transferred, and post-transfer
monitoring obligations.
125

See UN Convention Against Torture, supra note 106, art. 3.
Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, 25
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 477 (2003).
127 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 2951, 19 U.S.T. 6259.
126
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a. Transfer Where and to Whom?
LOAC places some limitations on the ability of a detaining authority to
transfer detainees in an armed conflict. In international armed conflict, POWs
can only be transferred to another state that is a party to the Geneva
Conventions.128 Furthermore, POWs are not to be transferred to an internment
facility that imposes additional hardship on their eventual repatriation.129 For
civilian internees held during occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention
prohibits occupying authorities from transferring civilian detainees out of the
occupied state.130 Protected persons, as defined in Article 4 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, also cannot be transferred to a state that is not a party to
the Geneva Conventions.131 Although all states are parties to the Geneva
Conventions, making this obligation—and the corresponding obligation
regarding transfer of POWs—seem no longer important, it does highlight the
importance placed on ensuring that POWs and protected persons retain the
protections of the Geneva Conventions in all situations. One notable difference
between the transfer regimes for POWs and for protected persons is that the
Fourth Geneva Convention specifically prohibits the transfer of a protected
person “to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for
his or her political opinions or religious beliefs,”132 a direct incorporation of
the full scope of non-refoulement. In all transfer cases, the detainee or POW is
to be afforded opportunity to notify his next of kin if he is transferred.133
Although the law of non-international armed conflict offers little black
letter guidance regarding the transfer of detainees in a non-international armed
conflict, the overarching international legal framework of non-refoulement in
human rights law and refugee law continues to apply at all times. Therefore,
detainees in non-international armed conflict cannot be transferred to a state or
another party where they will face torture or inhuman treatment.134 Article 5(4)
of Additional Protocol II does recognize the need for detaining powers to
consider the subsequent treatment of released or transferred detainees by
noting that, when releasing detainees, “necessary measures to ensure their
safety shall be taken by those so deciding.”135 At a minimum, this provision
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

GC III, supra note 9, art. 12.
Id. art. 46.
GC IV, supra note 9, art. 49.
Id. art. 45.
Id.
Id. art. 106; GC III, supra note 9, art. 48.
See UN Convention Against Torture, supra note 106, art 3.
AP II, supra note 9, art. 5(4).
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reinforces the principles and obligations inherent in non-refoulement. In
addition, the protections in Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention and
Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention can be seen as a useful guide even
in non-international armed conflict. Thus,
the humanitarian principle underlying these provisions, namely that a
detaining power should ensure that the ally to whom it transfers
detainees treats them according to the standards of the Geneva
Conventions, should also be taken into account in non-international
armed conflict (especially in so-called internationalized noninternational armed conflicts—that is, internal conflicts in which
foreign troops from outside the country intervene on the side of the
government). For instance, if countries contributing troops to a
multinational force in a non-international armed conflict transfer
detainees amongst each other, the principle underlying Articles 12(2)
of the Third and 45(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention should be
136
taken into account.

Similarly, domestic law and human rights law govern the transfer of any
detainees during a non-conflict situation as well, even when military personnel
are involved.
b. Post-transfer Monitoring and Obligations
A detaining party in international armed conflict or occupation may not
transfer a detainee to another authority that will violate the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions.137 For both POWs and protected persons, the authority
responsible for the original detention of an individual retains responsibility for
the detainee’s treatment even after transferring the detainee to another
authority.138 Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention thus mandates that
such transfers can only take place “after the Detaining Power has satisfied
itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the
Convention.”139 Although the transferee state then assumes responsibility for
the application of all obligations in the Geneva Conventions regarding the
detainees, the transferring state has obligations to step in and rectify the

136 Cordula Droege, Transfer of Detainees: Legal Framework, Non-refoulement, and Contemporary
Challenges, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 669, 675–76 (2008) (noting that the norms of humanitarian law, refugee
law, and human rights law must be seen as complimentary in such situations, not exclusionary).
137 See GC III, supra note 9, art. 12; GC IV, supra note 9, art. 45.
138 GC III, supra note 9, art. 12; GC IV, supra note 9, art. 45.
139 GC III, supra note 9, art. 12. The Fourth Geneva Convention contains the same requirement with
regard to transfers of Protected Persons in Article 45. See GC IV, supra note 9, art. 45.
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situation.140 As the Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention explains, this
system of subsidiary responsibility helps ensure appropriate treatment for any
transferred persons.141 Thus, the transferring power, upon learning of
inadequacies in treatment, may send direct assistance in the form of food,
medical equipment and personnel, or other provisions.142
If these measures nevertheless prove inadequate, if the poor treatment
given to prisoners is not caused merely by temporary difficulties but
by ill-will on the part of the receiving Power, or if for any other
reason the situation cannot be remedied, the Power which originally
143
transferred the prisoners must request that they be returned to it.

These responsibilities will often have a powerful impact on detention
decisions early on, such as in the Vietnam War, for example. Amidst the
complexity of the characterization of the conflict and the varied categories of
individuals involved in the conflict and being detained by U.S. forces, the
United States also faced the practical considerations involved in seeking to
transfer detainees to the South Vietnamese authorities. By characterizing a
broad swath of detainees as POWs, the United States ensured that it remained
in compliance with these obligations under the Third Geneva Convention.144
Transfer obligations and implementation is an area in which uncertainty
regarding the characterization of a conflict or situation—or differing
characterizations—and the resultant ambiguities are particularly problematic,
especially in multinational operations. For example, in Afghanistan, a variety

140 See, e.g., GC III, supra note 9, art. 12 (“Nevertheless, if [the transferee] Power fails to carry out the
provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were
transferred shall . . . take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners
of war.”). Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention contains the same obligation. GC IV, supra note 9, art.
45.
141 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (III) RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 137 (1952).
142 Id. at 138–39.
143 Id. at 139.
144 GEORGE S. PRUGH, VIETNAM STUDIES: LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964–1973, at 66 (1975) (“The
classification of Viet Cong combatants and Viet Cong suspects posed an interesting legal problem. Because it
believed the Viet Cong were traitors and criminals, the Vietnam government was reluctant to accord prisoner
of war status to Viet Cong captives. Furthermore it was certainly arguable that many Viet Cong did not meet
the criteria of guerrillas entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4, Geneva Prisoner of War
Conventions. However, civil incarceration and criminal trial of the great number of Viet Cong was too much
for the civil resources at hand. In addition, Article 22 prohibited the mingling of civil defendants with
prisoners of war. By broadly construing Article 4, so as to accord full prisoner of war status to Viet Cong Main
Force and Local Force troops, as well as regular North Vietnamese Army troops, any Viet Cong taken in
combat would be detained for a prisoner of war camp rather than a civilian jail.”).
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of considerations played a role in transfer decisions: the desire to assist the host
government in building capacity to ensure law and order, ISAF’s ninety-sixhour rule for release or transfer of detainees, and the fact that most
international organizations or states operating in Afghanistan do not have
facilities for holding people in custody.145 Because none of these
considerations would justify the failure to fulfill international legal obligations
under the principle of non-refoulement,146 many states have simply not
engaged in detention operations at all. In situations where multiple forces are
engaged in detention and possibly trial, such ambiguities can create situations
in which transfers are not carried out appropriately or are delayed
unnecessarily simply through a lack of clear legal guidelines. In addition, a
common problem is that in each new scenario, operators on the ground must
reinvent effective procedures in the absence of a discernable legal framework.
Questions of authority, obligation, individual rights, and procedures thus loom
large along the fault lines between different types of conflict and non-conflict
scenarios.
B. Use of Force and Conduct of Hostilities
States use military force in a wide range of situations, including many
outside of defined armed conflict scenarios. Considerations pertaining to the
use of force pose some of the most complicated issues in complex military
operations. The fundamental split between LOAC (applicable in times of
armed conflict) and human rights law (the governing framework in nonconflict situations and applicable during conflict subject to the more specific
authority of LOAC) highlights these challenges at the most basic level. LOAC
authorizes states to use force as a first resort against legitimate targets. In
contrast, human rights law requires that force be used only as a last resort, a
traditional law enforcement paradigm. The use of force outside an armed
conflict scenario also implicates the international law of self-defense.

145

Droege, supra note 136, at 693.
Id. (“Transfers arising in multinational operations abroad are only now drawing attention to legal and
practical issues. The real challenge will be to find practical solutions to accommodate the object and purpose
of those operations and their inherent restrictions as operations carried out at the invitation of the host
government and often under the auspices or even under the command and control of the United Nations.
Solutions will have to take into account the very limited capacity and political will to detain persons who
should normally be detained by the host country, while at the same time respecting the principle of nonrefoulement. Solutions can encompass, among others, prolongation of temporary detention, transfers to third
states, transfers to specific places where there is no risk, and monitoring or even joint administration of
detention to monitor transferred persons.”).
146
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Within these parameters, targeting issues, types of weapons, and the role
and authority of host nations in stability operations are key areas where lack of
characterization or conflicting characterizations can create ambiguities and
uncertainties for operators on the ground. Of particular concern are the
protection of civilians and individual rights, the implementation of
counterinsurgency principles within the framework of differing operations and
situations, and questions regarding the legitimacy of military operations. Each
of these concerns is highly relevant to the considerations raised above
regarding the forfeiting of options and the risk of legal violations. Issues
regarding use of force produce significant policy challenges beyond the legal
issues set forth below. These policy questions—such as public support for
military operations, effective coordination with allies and with host nation
officials and entities, and the coordination of multiple missions—can play a
major role in the effectiveness of military operations, both at home and on the
ground.
1. Targeting
In an armed conflict, LOAC permits the use of lethal force as a first resort
against legitimate military objectives, whether persons or objects.147 LOAC’s
fundamental principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack
guide the use of force and targeting considerations in all situations.148 One of
the most fundamental issues during conflict is identifying who or what can be
targeted. The principle of distinction, one of the “cardinal principles” of
LOAC, requires that any party to a conflict distinguish between those who are
fighting and those who are not and direct attacks solely at the former.149
Similarly, parties must distinguish between civilian objects and military
objects and target only the latter.150 The obligation to distinguish forms part of
147

Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights
Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUM. LEGAL STUDIES 52, 74–75 (2010).
148 Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 85 NAVAL WAR
C. INT’L L. 307, 308, 312, 323 (2009) (“Although the conflict [in Afghanistan] has become non-international,
it must be understood that the IHL norms governing attacks in international armed conflicts, on one hand, and
non-international armed attacks, on the other, have become nearly indistinguishable.”).
149 Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 257 (July 8) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (declaring that distinction and the prohibition on
unnecessary suffering are the two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law).
150 AP I, supra note 9, art. 48 (“[T]o ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives.”). Article 48 is considered customary international law. See CIHL, supra note
94, at 1 (2005).
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the customary international law of both international and non-international
armed conflicts, as the ICTY held in the Tadic case.151 The purpose of
distinction—to protect civilians—is emphasized in Article 51 of Additional
Protocol I, which states that “[t]he civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”152
Distinction thus requires identification of lawful targets as a prerequisite to
the use of force in armed conflict. A lawful attack must be directed at a
legitimate target: either a combatant, member of an organized armed group, a
civilian directly participating in hostilities, or a military objective.153 In
international armed conflicts, all members of the state’s regular armed forces
are combatants and can be identified by the uniform they wear, among other
characteristics.154 Other persons falling within the category of combatant
include members of volunteer militia who meet four requirements: wearing a
distinctive emblem, carrying arms openly, operating under responsible
command, and abiding by LOAC.155 Members of the regular armed forces of a
government not recognized by the opposing party and civilians participating in
a levée en masse also qualify as combatants in international armed conflict.156
Combatants can be attacked at all times and enjoy no immunity from attack,
except when they are hors de combat due to sickness, wounds, or capture. In
non-international armed conflicts, including state versus non-state actor
conflicts, there is no combatant status, but individuals who are members of an
organized armed group are legitimate targets of attack at all times.157 Finally,
151 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal,
¶¶ 27, 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“Bearing in mind the need for measures
to ensure the better protection of human rights in armed conflicts of all types, [. . . the General Assembly]
Affirms the following basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, without
prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of progressive development of the international law
of armed conflict: . . . 2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be
made at all times between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations.”) (alteration
in original) (quoting G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2675 (XXV) (Dec. 9, 1970)) (internal
quotation mark omitted); see also Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 257 (distinction is one of the “intransgressible principles of international
customary law”); Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 doc. 6 rev. ¶ 178 (1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/
Argentina11137.htm#_ftn1; CIHL, supra note 94, at 7–8.
152 AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(2).
153 See id. art. 48.
154 GC III, supra note 9, art. 4(1).
155 Id. art. 4(A)(2).
156 Id. arts. 4(A)(3), 4(A)(6).
157 See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 995, 999 (2008); see also JIMMY GURULÉ &
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civilians who take direct participation in hostilities are also legitimate targets
of attack during and for such time as they engage directly in hostilities.158
The principle of proportionality requires that parties refrain from attacks in
which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in relation to the
anticipated military advantage gained.159 Proportionality is not a mathematical
concept, but rather a guideline to help ensure that military commanders weigh
the consequences of a particular attack and refrain from launching attacks that
will cause excessive civilian deaths. The principle of proportionality is wellaccepted as an element of customary international law applicable in all armed
conflicts.160
The third key targeting principle concerns precautions. LOAC mandates
that all parties take certain precautionary measures to protect civilians.161
Precautions are, understandably, a critical component of the law’s efforts to
protect civilians and are of particular importance in densely populated areas or
areas where civilians are at risk from the consequences of military operations.
For this reason, even if a target is legitimate under the laws of war, failure to
take precautions can make an attack on that target unlawful. First, parties must
do everything feasible to ensure that targets are military objectives.162 Second,
they must choose the means and methods of attack with the aim of minimizing
incidental civilian losses and damage.163 Third, when choosing between two
possible attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must choose the
objective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian objects.164
Fourth, parties are required to refrain from any attacks that would be
disproportionate and to cancel any attacks where it becomes evident that the
civilian losses would be excessive in light of the military advantage.165 Finally,
GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 70–76 (2011) (discussing the rules governing
targeting of enemy forces in international and non-international armed conflict and noting that (1) “a member
of an enemy force . . . is presumed hostile and therefore presumptively subject to attack” in international armed
conflict; and (2) “subjecting members of organized belligerent groups to status based targeting pursuant to the
LOAC as opposed to civilians who periodically lose their protection from attack seems both logical and
consistent with the practice of states engaged in non-international armed conflicts”).
158 AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(3).
159 Id. art. 51(5)(b).
160 Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 292 (Susan C Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006);
Yoram Dinstein, The Laws of Air, Missile and Nuclear Warfare, 27 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1, 7 (1997).
161 AP I, supra note 9, art. 57.
162 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i).
163 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
164 Id. art. 57(3).
165 Id. arts. 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).
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Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I requires attacking parties to issue an
effective advance warning “of attacks which may affect the civilian population,
unless circumstances do not permit.”166 Each of these steps requires an
attacking party to take affirmative action to preserve civilian immunity and
minimize civilian casualties and damage.
These obligations to take precautions apply in both international and noninternational armed conflict and are considered customary international law.167
Article 13(1) of Additional Protocol II protects civilians and the civilian
population from the dangers arising from military operations;168 the principle
of precautions forms a natural component of that obligation. The obligation to
take precautions also appears in other treaties applicable in non-international
armed conflict, such as Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons169 and Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property.170
In the absence of an armed conflict, international human rights law and the
principles governing the use of force in law enforcement will govern. Article 6
of the ICCPR states that “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.”171 In a slightly different formulation, the European Convention on the
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms establishes the right to life
166

Id. art. 57(2)(c).
CIHL, supra note 94, at 51; see also AP I, supra note 9, arts. 57–58; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case
No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 524 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
168 AP II, supra note 9, art. 13(1).
169 Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other
Devices (Amended Protocol II) arts. 3(4), 4, May 3, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-1 (1997) (“All feasible
precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which this Article applies.
Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”).
170 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict art. 7, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 172 (“Without prejudice to other precautions required
by international humanitarian law in the conduct of military operations, each Party to the conflict shall: (a) do
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are not cultural property protected under Article
4 of the Convention; (b) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view
to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental damage to cultural property protected under Article 4
of the Convention; (c) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental
damage to cultural property protected under Article 4 of the Convention which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; and (d) cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes
apparent: (i) that the objective is cultural property protected under Article 4 of the Convention: (ii) that the
attack may be expected to cause incidental damage to cultural property protected under Article 4 of the
Convention which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”).
171 ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 6.
167
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and states that any “[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no
more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful
violence.”172 Here, the use of lethal force is—appropriately—tightly prescribed
and extraordinarily restricted.173 In such situations, it is the target’s conduct—
some sort of hostile action or threat—that justifies the use of force, in contrast
to armed conflicts, where many individuals (combatants and members of
organized armed groups) are targetable based solely on their membership in a
hostile organization or enemy armed force. In the case of civilians directly
participating in hostilities, of course, targeting is on the basis of conduct.
Ambiguities regarding whether a particular situation is a conflict or not can
undoubtedly create uncertainties and confusion with regard to targeting, the
use of force, and accompanying obligations.174
We can see some of these basic challenges in Afghanistan, where until
recently some ISAF contributing states did not characterize the situation as a
conflict.175 As a result, their forces could only employ force as a means of selfdefense,176 which impacts not only the use of force in specific situations, but
also the types of operations different coalition partners would and could

172 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2(2), Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221.
173 See Eighth United Nations Conference on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (stating that force can only be used “in selfdefence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration
of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and
resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to
achieve these objectives”); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-judicial
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defense?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 176 (2005) (“Under [international
human rights law,] the intentional use of lethal force by state authorities can be justified only in strictly limited
conditions. The state is obliged to respect and ensure the rights of every person to life and to due process of
law. Any intentional use of lethal force by state authorities that is not justified under the provisions regarding
the right to life, will, by definition, be regarded as an ‘extra-judicial execution.’”).
174 For a comprehensive treatment of the consequences of blurring the lines between the parameters of the
use of force in armed conflict and in self-defense (i.e., outside of armed conflict), see Laurie R. Blank,
Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Lines Between the Armed Conflict and Self-defense
Justifications, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
175 See, e.g., Changing the Rules in Afghanistan: German Troops Beef Up Fight Against Taliban, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INT’L (July 9, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,635192,00.html [hereinafter
Changing the Rules in Afghanistan] (describing the shift in the German government’s characterization of the
conflict).
176 See id. (noting that, in 2006, the German government added to the NATO operations plan a prohibition
on the use of lethal force except when an attack is underway or imminent; the provision was subsequently
removed in 2009).
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undertake at all. Where, as is the case in Afghanistan, some members of allied
forces operate under the rubric of non-international armed conflict and others
operate under a non-conflict characterization,177 allied forces often might
engage in joint operations under different rules of engagement and parameters
for the use of force. Divergent characterizations, leading to uncertain or even
contrasting legal paradigms governing the use of force, can leave those forces
vulnerable to miscommunication, inaction, and even danger.
Beyond the foundational issues apparent in the differing paradigms for the
use of force—above all whether it can be used in first resort or only in last
resort—there are additional areas where ambiguities can arise and cause
operational challenges. One involves compensation for the destruction of life
or property. Under U.S. law, for example, losses from combat are noncompensable, even though there may be specified authority to pay solatia,178
while losses from non-combat activities or wrongful or negligent acts are
compensable.179 Although this may at first appear to be a technical procedural
issue, it can become a complicated operational challenge in the face of
ambiguities regarding the controlling legal framework. Other areas that raise
potential concerns involve the use of force to defend others and the use of
force to defend property. Each of these is primarily addressed in the rules of
engagement (“ROE”), but can become quite complicated in complex
multinational operations in which disputes arise over the formulation and
implementation of ROE among different forces and in accordance with
different legal frameworks and mission objectives.
2. Weapons
Along with questions of lawful use of force, the range of permissible
weapons depends on the characterization of the situation. Any potential
ambiguities regarding permitted weapons generally occur along the line
between armed conflict and non-conflict, and, unlike the other key areas here,

177 Until late 2009, for example, Germany did not view its participation in ISAF as part of an armed
conflict. See id.; Thomas Darnstadt, Opinion, Germany Should Face Up to Reality of Civil War in Afghanistan,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (July 27, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,639203,00.html.
178 The Department of Defense uses its discretion to pay solatia to injured civilians or their families in
Afghanistan or Iraq. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-699, MILITARY
OPERATIONS: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF SOLATIA AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN (2007). Solatium is compensation for grief, as opposed to traditional damages for injury.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (9th ed. 2009).
179 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006).
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do not generally arise in the distinction between international and internal
armed conflict.
International law prohibits two categories of weapons in armed conflict:
indiscriminate weapons and weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. The
first prohibition appears in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I, which
defines indiscriminate attacks as attacks not directed at a specific military
objective; attacks “which employ a method or means of combat which cannot
be directed at a military objective; or [attacks] which employ a method or
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
Protocol.”180 Second, weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous
injury are prohibited.181 The goal is to minimize harm that is not justified by
military utility, either because of a lack of any utility at all or because the
utility gained is considerably outweighed by the suffering caused. These two
regulations on the use of weapons are part of customary international law in all
armed conflicts.182
However, some weapons prohibited under LOAC are lawful for use in law
enforcement scenarios, such as expanding bullets. LOAC prohibits exploding
or expanding projectiles (e.g., hollow point rounds) because they cause
unnecessary suffering.183 An enemy soldier is rendered hors de combat just as
effectively with normal non-expanding bullets. However, expanding bullets have
an important and legitimate use in civilian law enforcement situations. Bullets
that expand on impact are less likely to go through the target and hit innocent
bystanders or do collateral damage to property (for example, the skin of an
aircraft).184 For this reason, they are especially valuable in hostage and counterterrorist operations. In today’s complex conflicts involving both military
operations against terrorists and a range of other counterterrorism measures, it is
not difficult to see how ambiguities in the characterization of situations can lead
to uncertainty regarding the application of this prohibition.
180

AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(4).
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(e), Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, reprinted in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS OF 1899 (II)
AND 1907 (IV) RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND (1915).
182 Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 257 (July 8) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
183 Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 36 Stat. 2277; U.K.
MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 6.1. In addition, the use of such bullets is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xix), opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
184 Use of Expanding Ammunition by U.S. Military Forces in Counterterrorist Incidents, Op. JAG, U.S.
Army, DAJA-IA/No. 7026, 23 Sept. 1985, as reprinted in ARMY LAW., Nov. 1985, at 45, 46.
181
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Other weapons, such as riot control agents, present similar challenges.
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”), the use of riot control
agents is prohibited as a means of warfare.185 At the same time, the CWC
recognizes that “purposes not prohibited” by the convention include “[l]aw
enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.”186 Especially in
situations of occupation, where the occupying power may face difficulties in
establishing order even while armed conflict continues, finding the dividing
line between a “method of warfare” and a legitimate law enforcement tool can
be a daunting task. “[T]he use of riot control agents as a less-than-lethal means
of law enforcement in the midst of an ongoing armed conflict must [therefore]
be reconciled with the prohibition on their use as ‘a method of warfare.’”187
Military operations across a range of situations, including both non-conflict
and certain stability operations and counterinsurgency, can encounter various
scenarios in which riot control agents in particular may prove effective, both
operationally and in light of the overall mission goals. Along the often difficult
to discern line between conflict and non-conflict, operators on the ground need
to know what their lawful options are in any given scenario and need to retain
the flexibility the appropriate legal framework may offer.
3. Host Nation Control and Influence
Just as the type of military operations in a foreign country can run the
gamut from disaster relief to international armed conflict, so the degree of
influence and authority the host nation government can exert on those
operations varies widely. Obviously, a nation engaged in an international
armed conflict with an opposing nation enjoys no authority over that nation’s
military operations. Beyond that clear-cut situation, however, finding clear
parameters and common ground regarding the appropriate measure of host
nation influence on military operations and the determinative legal framework
for such analysis can be a struggle.
Moreover, conflicts are not static and the relationship between the host
state and foreign deployed forces will likely change as a conflict evolves. In
the case of an occupation, for example, as the occupation matures and as a new
185

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I(5), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 (“Each State Party undertakes not
to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”).
186 Id. art. II(9)(d).
187 Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary
Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (2004).
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local government is established, or as the occupation transitions into a
consensual deployment or, potentially, into a non-international armed conflict,
the host state may enjoy greater influence over operations conducted within the
host nation. In other situations, a host state will likely exert a greater degree of
control over forces consensually deployed within its territory—either in a nonconflict capacity or in support of a non-international armed conflict in which
the host state is engaged.
Where the host nation has a measure of influence over the operations being
conducted in its territory, the degree of control it exerts may be established
through or limited by a UN mandate, a SOFA, or other instrument setting forth
the respective authority of the host and visiting forces.188 Frequently, political
considerations will dictate the influence a host nation exercises. In occupation,
consent from the occupying force will usually be all that is required.
Fundamentally, however, the presence of foreign forces within a state’s
territory is contingent upon that state’s consent. Beyond that, there is little
framework for understanding exactly where the parameters of host nation
influence lie regarding the planning and implementation of military operations.
Recent conflicts offer extensive evidence of the complex nature of these
relationships.
For example, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 triggered an
international armed conflict. Upon the initial defeat of the Taliban and the
establishment of the Karzai government, it was generally recognized that the
conflict became a non-international armed conflict between the Karzai
government and the United States on one side and insurgent Taliban forces on
the other.189 Many view U.S. operations to combat al Qaeda in Afghanistan as
a separate non-international armed conflict.190 At the same time, some NATO
allies participating in ISAF characterize their involvement as non-conflict
stability operations.191 Additionally, U.S. and other ISAF forces operate under
a UN mandate while a SOFA governs U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom
forces.192 Each of these scenarios—whether concurrent or simultaneous—has
188 See Roisin Burke, Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Jurisdictional
Immunity, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 63, 65–66 (2011).
189 See Robin Geiss & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Affected the Rules on the
Conduct of Hostilities?, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 11, 15 (2011) (discussing SOFAs and other mandates with
regard to UN peacekeeping forces).
190 Id. at 51 n.21.
191 See supra notes 175–77.
192 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1833, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1833 (2008). The SOFA governing the presence of the
U.S. military in Afghanistan is a diplomatic note. Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Military
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ramifications for the role and influence of the Afghan government regarding
operations and for its engagement with different national forces. U.S.
operations in Pakistan introduce additional questions regarding both the
government of Pakistan and even the Karzai government given the close links
between the operations and their key goals and impact on each other. Iraq
demonstrated these issues as well through a slightly different lens, folding the
issue of occupation and transition from occupation into the mix.
C. Civil–Military Relations
In all situations where military forces are deployed, the relationship
between the military and a range of civilian actors plays a role, especially as
international NGOs and multinational military forces work together more often
in the same theater of operations. Here the potential ambiguities from
uncertainty regarding the applicable legal framework create operational
challenges for both military and civilian actors, in essence multiplying the
potential issues. Three primary areas are of particular interest here:
humanitarian assistance, the relationship between militaries and
nongovernmental organizations, and the provision of advisory and training
services to the host nation government, law enforcement, and military.
1. Humanitarian Assistance
It is axiomatic that humanitarian assistance efforts are critical to the
survival and protection of civilian populations during conflict situations and
natural disasters, and even in times of internal disturbances. Relief
organizations often have to navigate access to conflict zones and areas under
military control, which implicates both domestic and international law,
depending on the scenario at hand. In armed conflict, international
humanitarian law recognizes a role for humanitarian assistance organizations
in alleviating the suffering of civilians, and recognizes the special role of the
ICRC and its national affiliate organizations in international armed conflicts
and occupations. 193

and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in Connection with
Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Military Training and
Exercises, and Other Activities, State Dep’t No. 03-67, available at 2003 WL 21754316, *1–4 (entered into
force May 28, 2003).
193 See GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 3, 10.
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The law of international armed conflict includes numerous obligations for
belligerent parties to permit humanitarian relief operations. Article 23 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention requires all states to allow “free passage of all
consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects for religious worship
intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter
is its adversary.”194 Also included in the free passage obligation are foodstuffs,
clothing, and other essentials for children, pregnant women, and new
mothers.195 Article 70 of Additional Protocol I then provides a more
comprehensive framework for the provision of humanitarian assistance during
international armed conflict, mandating relief operations for the entire civilian
population if essential supplies are running low.196 Although this provision
does state that such relief is provided subject to the agreement of the parties
concerned, the Commentary to Additional Protocol I explains that parties do
not have carte blanche to refuse relief shipments; rather, refusals to allow relief
consignments “should thus remain exceptional.”197 The Fourth Geneva
Convention also contains specific obligations regarding the provision of
humanitarian relief during occupation, requiring an occupying power to allow
and facilitate relief operations when “[all] or part of the population of occupied
territory is inadequately supplied.”198 All states must permit free passage for
and protect such consignments of humanitarian relief.199
During non-international armed conflict, the rules regarding humanitarian
assistance are significantly sparser. Common Article 3 recognizes the right of
the ICRC or other independent humanitarian entities to offer assistance to the
parties to the conflict.200 With regard specifically to the provision of relief
supplies, Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol II requires humanitarian
assistance efforts when “the civilian population is suffering undue hardship
owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and
medical supplies,”201 subject to the consent of the relevant state where the
conflict is taking place. The requirement that the government consent to relief
shipments does raise concerns. However, the Commentary to Additional

194

Id. art. 23.
Id.
196 AP I, supra note 9, art. 70.
197 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
CONVENTIONS 820 (1977) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY].
198 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 59.
199 Id.
200 Common Article 3, supra note 12.
201 AP II, supra note 9, art. 18(2).
195

TO THE

GENEVA
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Protocol II reinforces that states cannot withhold access for relief shipments
without good grounds for doing so. Rather,
[t]he fact that consent is required does not mean that the decision is
left to the discretion of the parties. If the survival of the population is
threatened and a humanitarian organization fulfilling the required
conditions of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy
202
this situation, relief actions must take place.

Refusing to allow such shipments in such situations, could be equivalent to
using starvation as a means of warfare, for example. During the internal
conflict in Sri Lanka, human rights organizations sharply criticized the Sri
Lankan government’s restrictions on international aid workers, noting that if
the government cannot meet its obligations to provide humanitarian relief to
the civilian population, “it must allow the humanitarian community to do so on
its behalf. Parties to a conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of
impartial humanitarian relief personnel—only in cases of military necessity
may their activities or movements be temporarily restricted.”203 In practice, the
parameters for the provision of humanitarian relief may prove to be quite
similar in international and non-international armed conflict, but it is important
to recognize the differences so that relief organizations can maximize their
abilities to help those in need during armed conflicts.
In non-conflict situations, humanitarian relief is subject to the domestic law
of the host state. Although human rights law mandates that host states may not
restrict access to relief to the extent that such restrictions would violate the
state’s human rights obligations, access is ultimately subject to the state’s laws
governing entry visas, importation guidelines, and similar issues.
In all of these situations, the relationship between civilian relief workers
and military personnel will be guided by the relevant legal framework and
parameters for access to conflict zones or natural disaster areas. Any potential
ambiguities regarding these legal obligations and privileges may ultimately
result in diminished services and protection for the civilian population that
both civilian and military actors on the ground are trying to protect and serve, a
counterproductive result.

202

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 197, at 1479.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR ON THE DISPLACED, SRI LANKAN ARMY AND LTTE ABUSES AGAINST
CIVILIANS IN THE VANNI 26 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/srilanka0209
web_0.pdf.
203
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2. Militaries and NGOs
The relationship between the military and NGOs on the ground during
military operations can be fraught with interesting challenges, even when both
actors are working toward the same or similar goals. There are three main
types of operations in which militaries and NGOs must cooperate: natural
disasters, such as floods, typhoons, tsunamis, earthquakes, epidemics, or
famine; technological disasters, such as chemical spills, radiological releases,
or oil spills; and complex humanitarian emergencies, defined by the United
Nations as “humanitarian crises in a country, region or society where there is
total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external
conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the
mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.”204
The first two situations do not constitute armed conflict and thus do not trigger
LOAC and its attendant rights and duties. The third category, however, may
well often rise above the threshold for triggering LOAC, depending on the
nature and extent of the conflict.
In most disaster response operations, the military’s primary mission will be
to establish a safe and secure environment, which enables NGOs to provide
relief and other assistance as needed. “Carrying out these missions may require
the military to first establish a secure environment, then to provide
transportation, communication, and/or security for the NGOs as well as for the
military force itself.”205 The characterization of the situation—as non-conflict,
non-international armed conflict, or international armed conflict—will affect
the rights and obligations military forces have in the course of fulfilling these
missions, as noted with regard to many of the issues discussed earlier in this
Article. If the operation takes place in the context of one of the first two types
of disaster response operations described above, meaning it is not during a
conflict, the host nation’s domestic law will govern, along with international
human rights law and any bilateral agreements regarding the provision of
assistance. During conflict, LOAC will provide the dominant and overarching
legal framework, but the characterization as non-international or international

204

INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF MILITARY AND CIVIL DEFENCE ASSETS
SUPPORT UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES 3 (2003), available at
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docID=4411&type=pdf.
205 LISA WITZIG DAVIDSON ET AL., HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE OPERATIONS: NGOS AND THE MILITARY
IN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS 12 (1996), available at http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Davidson_Humanitarian.
pdf.
TO
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armed conflict will then affect the extent of the application of host nation law
and international human rights law.
One issue that has arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years is the
extent of military control of areas where civilian actors, namely international
NGOs, live and work in the conflict area. In the face of the dangers in both
conflict zones, it has been common for NGO workers to live in the same
secured areas as military units.206 Such arrangements often raise questions for
NGOs regarding their independence, neutrality, and ability to access a range of
actors—civilian and military—on both sides in the conflict zone. As discussed
in greater detail above, the military will have greater control over areas in
certain conflict situations rather than others, such that different conflict
characterizations can produce differing interpretations of the level of military
control and NGO access and independence.
A separate but related issue that stems directly from the close engagement
between the military and NGOs occurs when military personnel “go
humanitarian”—e.g., when they use humanitarian cover, in civilian clothing,
for intelligence gathering and similar activities. Many NGOs raise legitimate
concerns about the impact on the safety of their personnel in the aftermath of
such military activities. These concerns are not necessarily directly related to
questions of conflict characterization or applicable legal frameworks, but
certainly arise with greater frequency and concern in conflict situations rather
than non-conflict situations, reinforcing the need to clarify the line between the
two.
3. Training and Advisory Roles
In today’s counterinsurgency and stability operations, the interface between
the military and the host nation is a critical piece of the mission, not just for the
purpose of coordinating operations, but to enhance capacity building across the
range of the judicial, security and political infrastructure. Military advisors
often face significant challenges in providing advice to their counterparts in the
host nation, whether military or civilian, due to uncertainties regarding the
parameters of the advisory relationship or the specific substance of particular
exchanges. In missions where the role of rule of law advisor is such a critical
one, the ambiguities and operational challenges set forth above loom large.
When capacity building is at the heart of counterinsurgency efforts and
206 Volker Franke, The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil–Military Cooperation in Stability Operations, 11
INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 5, 6 (2006).
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stability operations—across a range of conflict situations—it is essential that
actors on the ground be able to communicate effectively regarding the
applicable legal framework and the obligations of the various actors involved,
civilian or military, host nation or multinational. And yet it is here, in the oneon-one relationships between advisor and host nation official, that ambiguities
and uncertainties crop up time and again, leading to continued requests for
further guidance from training and analysis centers back in the United States.
Multinational operations can manifest more complex challenges in this
area. In Afghanistan, the ISAF force includes troops from many different
nations, many of whom focus their operations on capacity building.207 If these
different contingents characterize the overall situation differently, they will
thus have varying parameters for the provision of training and capacity
building and for the content of such programs. The distinction between the
U.S. view and the pre-2010 German view in Afghanistan offers a useful
example: “U.S. forces conduct practical training for the Afghan army in real
combat situations,” but such training fell “outside the German mandate.”208 In
contrast, German forces at first applied police training methods relevant to
domestic law enforcement activities.209 Although both types of training were
useful and important, the clash in perspectives reduced the ability to engage in
joint operations and joint decision-making on these issues.
D. Third State Responsibilities
International armed conflicts trigger the law of neutrality, which delineates
the boundaries between the battlespace and neutral space, on which no fighting
between belligerents may take place. The law of neutrality “defines the
relationship under international law between states engaged in an armed
conflict and those that are not participating in that armed conflict.”210 Based on
207 See Troop Numbers and Contribution, AFG. INT’L SECURITY FORCE, http://www.isaf.nato.int/troopnumbers-and-contributions/index.php (last visited May 5, 2012). “Capacity development is the process by
which individuals, organizations, institutions and societies develop abilities to perform functions, solve
problems and set and achieve objectives.” Committee of Experts on Public Administration, 5th Sess., Mar. 27–
31, 2006, Definition of Basic Concepts and Terminologies in Governance and Public Administration: Note by
the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/C.16/2006/4 (Jan. 5, 2006).
208 James D. Bindenagel, Afghanistan: The German Factor, PRISM, Sept. 4, 2010, at 95, 107.
209 Id.
210 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 1.42; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELFDEFENSE 25–26 (2001) (“The laws of neutrality are operative only as long as the neutral State retains its
neutral status. Once that State becomes immersed in the hostilities, the laws of neutrality cease being
applicable, and the laws of warfare take their place. However, if the neutral State does not embroil itself in
war, the laws of neutrality are activated from the onset of the war until its conclusion.”).
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the fundamental principle that neutral territory is inviolable,211 neutrality law
seeks to (1) contain the spread of hostilities, particularly by keeping down the
number of participants; (2) define the legal rights of parties and nonparties to
the conflict; and (3) limit the impact of war on nonparticipants, especially with
regard to commerce.212 Neutrality law thus leads to a geography-based
framework in which belligerents can fight on belligerent territory or the
commons but must refrain from any operations on neutral territory. This
framework protects third states that are neutral from becoming part of the
battleground of the armed conflict and prevents them from supporting any
party to the armed conflict.
The Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land of 1907 (“Hague V”) sets forth neutrality
law’s basic principles. Beyond upholding the inviolability of neutral territory,
Hague V prohibits the movement of belligerent troops or materiel across
neutral territory213 and the use of military installations or communications
facilities on neutral territory.214 In addition, belligerent states may not attack
targets in neutral territory, unless, as stated below, the neutral state fails to
ensure its territory is not used for belligerent purposes. For its part, a neutral
power must not provide, or enable the provision of, military supplies to any
belligerent, nor allow its territory to be used for military operations.215 Indeed,
it may use force—as necessary and within its capability—to prevent
belligerent powers from using its territory for war-making purposes.216 To the
extent a neutral state is unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory for
such purposes, “a belligerent state may become entitled to use force in self211 Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land
art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague V]; see also GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG
NATIONS 844 (6th ed. 1992) (“The basic right, beyond any question, is the inviolability of neutral
territory . . . and all other neutral rights really are mere corollaries to that fundamental principle.”); MORRIS
GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 534 (1959) (“The chief and most vital right of a neutral
state is that of the inviolability of its territory.”); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 179 (5th ed. 1967) (explaining that the rights and duties of neutral powers under international customary
law can be summarized in three basic rules: “(1) [a] neutral State must abstain from taking sides in the war and
from assisting either belligerent[;] (2) [a] neutral State has the right and duty to prevent its territory from being
used by either belligerent as a base for hostile operations[; and] (3) [a] neutral State must acquiesce in certain
restrictions which belligerents are entitled to impose on peaceful intercourse between its citizens and their
enemies, in particular, limitations on the freedom of the seas”).
212 John Astley III & Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations, 42 A.F. L. REV. 119,
139 (1997).
213 Hague V, supra note 211, art. 2.
214 Id. art. 3.
215 DINSTEIN, supra note 210, at 26–27.
216 Hague V, supra note 211, arts. 5, 10.
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defence against enemy forces operating from the territory of that neutral state,”
based on the ordinary rules governing the resort to force.217 As a companion to
Hague V, the Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
in Naval War of 1907 (“Hague XIII”) sets forth principles of neutrality law for
conflicts at sea.218
In non-international armed conflicts, however, the law of neutrality does
not apply.219 Third states may lawfully support a state against a non-state actor,
thus becoming party to the existing non-international armed conflict220—like
the United States in Afghanistan, for example. In contrast, third state support
for a non-state actor against a state violates the general international law
principle of nonintervention.221 Depending on the third state’s support or
control of the non-state actor, the third state may, through its support of the
non-state actor, commit an armed attack against the state or incur responsibility
for the actions of the non-state actor.222 Alternatively, the nature and extent of
such third-state support for a non-state actor may also result in an international
armed conflict, such as in the former Yugoslavia.223 The principle of nonintervention also remains in effect in non-conflict situations.224
In today’s interconnected world, understanding the role of third states and
external actors is a critical piece of the puzzle. Military and civilian actors on
the ground in a conflict situation, peace operation, or other situation cannot
operate in a vacuum but rather must take into account the actions of third states
and external actors. To do so, they need a clear understanding of the applicable
legal framework that guides the behavior of such actors and sets out
parameters for the involvement in any conflict or non-conflict operation.

217

U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 1.43.a.
Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2415.
219 PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 307 (2010).
220 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 93
(June 27) (describing how a state can be involved in a non-international armed conflict).
221 See id. at 98 (noting that if the right of a state to intervene and support an internal opposing force in
another state were validated, it would “involve a fundamental modification of the customary law principle of
non-intervention”).
222 Id. at 109–10.
223 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 79, 569 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugoslavia July 14, 1997) (holding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s effective control over the
military forces of the Republika Srpska created an international armed conflict).
224 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at 106.
218
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III. THE WAY FORWARD
This Article focuses on two fundamental issues endemic to today’s
operations, as well as many past military operations: characterization of the
conflict/non-conflict situation and the operational challenges on the ground
that can arise in the face of uncertain or differing characterizations. Military
and civilian actors on the ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, and a range
of other hotspots have addressed these issues with grace and adept analysis
over the years, but ambiguities continue to arise and pose challenges time and
again. When coupled with the range of strategic and policy issues underlying
conflict characterization, the above discussion demonstrates that these
normative issues do indeed make a real difference. Clear and consistent
characterization of conflict certainly could help alleviate some of the
challenges noted throughout this Article. However, as noted in the analysis of
the strategic and policy considerations in Part I, policymakers have significant
incentives to maintain flexibility in most situations. It is therefore essential to
understand the consequences of such flexibility at the operational level and
recognize that uncertainties and ambiguities may well remain, given the
complicated nature of modern peace and stability operations, conflicts, and
counterinsurgency operations. Minimizing both the ambiguities and their
effects through training, tailored operational planning, and other resources will
then be a crucial goal for both military and civilian actors at home and in the
field.

